Of Spectacles, Farce & Anna Hazare’s Fast

One of the interesting aspects of the discourse around the spectacle involving Anna Hazare & Lokpal Bill is a universalization and depoliticization of the term “corruption”. Forget those eulogizing or joining this farce, even those critical of this spectacle typically begin with a clarification that corruption indeed is a “problem” that needs to be prioritized, perhaps at the cost of other “problems”. Such universalization is indeed surprising and defies logic. Given that even organizations like the Transparency International are yet to arrive at a consensus on how to define, let alone measure “corruption”, obviously such universalization of the term “corruption” involves an abstraction that we are missing out in this discourse.

Let us put this in context. Consider a society with a prior arbitrarily specified assignment of endowment of resources. Further, assume that this endowment is protected by a legal provision of property rights. Obviously, as anyone who has studied even a basic course in economic theory will tell you, members of such a society are likely to enter into a series of voluntary mutually beneficial exchanges. Such mutually beneficial exchanges would typically be legally permitted in a society with property rights, until one reaches a limit of such transactions. Any re-allocation or redistribution of resources beyond this limit would require subverting the legal framework accompanying the existing arrangements of property rights. Further, assuming as most standard economic theorists do, that individuals in this society are selfish and care only about their own welfare, it would follow that most members of this society would actually desire to subvert the legal framework in order to achieve such a re-allocation or redistribution. Fear of punitive legal measures would be the only reason preventing them from actually executing such a desire. In other words, ultimately it would be a balance of the expected benefits from a redistribution and the expected costs of legal punitive measures which will, in the ultimate analysis determine how many individuals in such a society would respect the “rule of law”.

Let us now be more specific. Assume that the initial assignment of property rights is unequal and vastly favors a small section of the society. Further, assume a political structure where the balance of political power resembles the balance of economic power, i.e. the individuals or the group benefitting from the initial endowment of property rights are also the ones who enjoy greater political power. One can think of three possible responses from individuals in this society with regard to their prior assigned property rights. Firstly, there would be a (rebel) group wanting a re-allocation towards a more equitable distribution of resources and wealth. Secondly, there would be a group which would want a re-allocation to a more inequitable distribution in their favor. Thirdly, there would be a law-abiding group whose balance of costs and benefits from an attempt to subvert law would make them favor status quo.

Focusing on the first two groups, let us next look at the specific form that such an attempt at redistribution of resources through subversion of law might take. Such attempts might take the form of (a) physically attempting to redistribute resources (stealing, robbery, dacoity etc.) (b) attempts to change the balance of political power so that a large-scale redistribution can be undertaken (political mobilization, activism, terrorism, coup etc.) and (c) attempts at using existing distribution of political power to undertake redistribution of resources in their favor. It is clear that the rebel group attempting a more equitable distribution would adopt (a) and/or (b), whereas the group attempting a more inequitable distribution would, under normal circumstances, adopt (c) (though an adoption of (a) or (b) also might not be ruled out). It is also obvious that it is (c) which would typically correspond to what we normally understand as “corruption”. The point to note is that (c), in some sense, represents an unfinished project of sorts. In other words, we should expect (c) to be prevalent in societies where the dominant political group has not yet finished reallocating economic resources to itself to the extent justified by its political clout. The unfinished project would come to an end only when the ruling elite has undertaken the task of consolidation through suitably controlling the political structure. A classic case of such a corruption-free society would be a dictatorship – the ultimate dream of anti-corruption brigade. However, experience shows that even a political democracy with appropriate institutional arrangements to prevent a democratic uprising from below can do the job pretty well.

The above point would be clearer if we consider the wide divergence in the legal framework which governs the definition of corruption across space and time. For instance, in an era of license raj, the elite would need to be “corrupt” in order to satisfy consumeristic aspirations which would be considered “legal” elsewhere. A dismantling of this license raj structure, therefore, reduce “corruption” in such a society through a process of consolidation by the dominant political class, so that they would no longer need to break a law to satisfy consumerist aspirations. Similarly, the erstwhile “communist” countries represented a classic case of such “unfinished project” – where the ruling elite (for instance, leaders of communist parties under the Leninist vanguard model) was yet to consolidate, making these regions some of the most “corrupt” in the world. The developed countries, on the other hand, where such a consolidation has already taken place a long time back, are also some of the least “corrupt”.

The current discourse on corruption need to be seen in this context. Existence of rampant “corruption” in India represents an unfinished project by the ruling elites to consolidate, and to re-allocate economic resources in a fashion that better represents their political clout. It is an unfinished project that started with post-independence state-led industrialization, continued with dismantling this very structure created in the first phase with the process of liberalization and economic reforms. Calls to “end corruption”, in this sense, must be looked upon as a ruling class demand which is impatient with the unfinished project. The fact that the much publicized “Jan Lokpal Bill” takes clear steps of taking India towards fascism comes as no surprise. After all, fascism is a logical culmination of the unfinished project, leading to ultimate elitist dream of a “corruption-free”, in fact all vice-free society where the rule of law prevails, because the law is framed by those in control of the political structure which is able to suppress any defiance with an iron hand. The fact that such a discourse should occupy so much of popular imagination also represents a triumph of this social class. Both the “corrupt” and “anti-corrupt” emerges from the same social class with the same objective, making a spectacle out of the shadow-boxing match.

One might, however, pose a question as a counter-argument to above: is it not a fact that the poor also does get affected by corruption? Is it not the case that in a corrupt society, the poor also needs to pay bribes to get work done, and where the impact of many pro-poor policies are reduced due to existence of corruption? Such an argument, however, is misleading on several counts. Firstly, while it is true that the poor is often forced to pay bribes out of meagre income, it is also equally true that the same poor is also forced to pay a price in the market for almost anything else he/she buys. Emphasizing the first component (bribe) while finding nothing immoral or wrong about the second involves a value judgement that, with little justification, places a moral superiority in fairness of the markets. An unbiased analysis demands that one is as critical of existence of markets as one is with the existence of corruption. In fact, to the extent that a poor spends a greater fraction of income in market rather than in paying bribes, abolition of markets should take precedence over abolition of corruption. Secondly, to the extent that the poor does get affected by corruption, it represents a balance of political and economic power for which the anti-corruption brigade has little solution. Detaching “corruption” out of this whole package would mean very little, and offers very little to the poor victims. The only section of the society which would benefit from such an end to “corruption” would be the ruling elite, which would be able to consolidate in a way that it no longer needs to be corrupt.

Making a spectacle out of this shadow-boxing match, however, also has a few additional significance. It would be worthwhile to recall that, while a farce is created out of a 98-hour hunger strike in the heart of the capital under the glare of media and celebrities, in the same country another brave woman still continues with a decade long hunger-strike against one of the most oppressive laws of this country – the Armed Forces Special Power Act 1956. There are also powerful and very real forces of resistance against injustice taking place at this very moment around the country. In other words, in term of our earlier classification, there is a lot of (a) and (b) happening around the country. In the midst of these very real struggles emanating from below, making a spectacle out of Anna Hazare’s fast has an important significance. By fetishizing corruption, it detaches the broader exploitative system from the misery of our existence, while the spectacle itself provides an outlet for alienation. The irrationality of the farce of mobilization around such a spectacle eventually succeeds in reducing the credibility of all mobilizations, including more legitimate ones. Anna Hazare’s 98-hour farce of a fast for a cause that is essentially anti-democratic occupies the space that might have belonged, for instance, to the far more legitimate eleven-year long fast of Irom Sharmila. It is this aspect of spectacle that one needs to keep in mind while making an appraisal of the unfolding drama at Jantar Mantar. It would be apt here, to remember an old situationist slogan: “Irrationality of the spectacle spectacularizes rationality.” It is this spectacularization that we need to pay careful attention to stay away from.

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